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Introduction
Discounting is a process in which the subjective 
values of reinforcements and punishments are decreased. 
There are several types of discounting, one of which is the 
discounting of delayed values, which refers to a preference 
for one of two possible reinforcements or punishments, 
i.e. an immediate one or a delayed one (Rachlin, Raineri, 
& Cross, 1991). Discounting can be measured in real or 
hypothetical situations, however previous studies have 
revealed that there is no difference between the rate of 
discounting of hypothetical and real monetary rewards 
(Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Lagorio & Madden, 2005; 
Madden et al., 2004; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 
2003). In short, study participants make a choice or series 
of choices between two different values of reinforcement 
(e.g. gain) or punishment (e.g. loss) in different conditions, 
e.g. $10 now or $100 tomorrow. There are other types of 
discounting – probabilistic, social (Rachlin, 1993), and 
effort discounting (Mitchell, 1999; Sugiwaka & Okouchi, 
2004) – but delayed discounting seems to have been studied 
the most.
Most studies of discounting have used money as 
a reward (Foxall, Doyle, Yani-de-Soriano, & Wells, 
2011; Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; Jarmolowicz 
et al., 2014; Ostaszewski & Bialaszek, 2010; Rachlin et 
al., 1991; Weatherly, 2011). However, some studies have 
used more biological rewards, such as sexual intercourse 
(Holt, Newquist, Smits, & Tiry, 2014; Jarmolowicz et 
al., 2014) or food (Holt et al., 2014; Mischel, Shoda, & 
Rodriguez, 1989). Generally, the research on reinforcement 
discounting shows that people prefer immediate small 
rewards over delayed large rewards, i.e. the higher the rate 
of discounting, the greater the preference for immediate 
reinforcement (Rachlin et al., 1991). There are, however, 
a few studies that have focused on the discounting of 
punishments. It is important to note that for punishment, 
a faster discounting rate means a stronger preference for 
delayed punishments, i.e. the more delayed punishment 
is, the less severe it seems to be. That is why delayed 
punishment is preferred to immediate one. 
A few studies on discounting of monetary losses 
(serving as punishments) show that the preference is 
opposite of that for the discounting of monetary gains 
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(serving as reinforcements), i.e. delayed losses are 
preferred over immediate losses (Estle, Green, Myerson, 
& Holt, 2006; Ostaszewski & Karzel, 2002; Weatherly & 
Derenne, 2013). However, most of the previous studies on 
punishment discounting have dealt only with monetary 
losses. While money is a non-biological, conditioned 
stimulus, pain is a universal, biological, and unconditioned 
phenomenon (Macrae & Davies, 1999). For these reasons, 
pain seems to be an interesting potential punishment to 
study. 
According to the International Association for the 
Study of Pain, pain is ‘an unpleasant sensory and emotional 
experience associated with actual or potential tissue 
damage, or described in terms of such damage’ (Merskey 
& Bogduk, 1994). We can say with high probability that 
pain, behaviourally, is a punishment because its role is to 
avoid the behaviours that cause it. 
Very few studies have been conducted on the 
discounting of pain. However, Story and collaborators 
(2013) recently conducted two experiments. In the first 
one, participants had to choose between real immediate 
and delayed pain that was inflicted by electric stimulation. 
In the second study, another group of participants had 
to choose hypothetical dental pain of varying intensity. 
The results indicated that there is, in fact, a preference 
to choose more intense pain sooner rather than later. The 
researchers tried to explain this finding in terms of the 
dread of future pain resulting from anticipation of that pain; 
however, they did not go into details on the mechanism 
of the effects of dread on the discounting of pain. Story 
and colleagues (2013) only suggested that dread, as the 
prospective sum of anticipated punishment, might work as 
a cue for behavioural suppression during the delay. This 
suggestion is based on the fact that prediction of shock can 
lead to a conditioned suppression, reducing the vigor of 
instrumental responding (Estes & Skinner, 1941). Other 
possibility suggested by Story and colleagues (2013) is that 
dread is a substitute for a stimulus and the observation that 
some cues associated with the prediction of pain (in that 
case) can elicit the pain itself.
Similar results to those obtained by Story and 
collaborators (2013) were found a few decades earlier by 
Hare (1966). He studied pain preference in psychopaths, 
non-psychopathic criminals, and non-criminals. Although 
psychopaths chose immediate pain in only 55% of 
situations, the rest of the participants revealed an explicit 
preference for immediate electric shock – they chose 
quicker pain in 82.3% of situations. 
Although discounting of reinforcements and punish-
ments seem to be very different behavioural processes, 
sometimes they can converge. Some examples are: 
(a) unpleasant work followed by payment for that work, 
(b) a painful procedure that results in recovery, and 
(c) risky investing in the stock market when an initial loss 
can produce a larger gain. It is difficult to study just one 
type of discounting (e.g. delayed discounting), as both 
reinforcement and punishment often come not only with 
a delay, but with risk (probabilistic discounting) or physical 
effort (effort discounting). It seems that the painful dental 
procedure investigated by Story and colleagues (Story et 
al., 2013) is a good example of a situation in which delayed 
discounting of pain can be studied without the risk of being 
biased by effort, probabilistic, or social discounting.
In summary, previous studies indicate that people 
tend to choose delayed punishments over immediate 
punishments (Estle et al., 2006; Ostaszewski & Bialaszek, 
2010; Weatherly & Derenne, 2013), but this is not the 
case when choices of pain are studied (Hare, 1966; 
Story et al., 2013). In most of the previous studies, 
delayed punishment was of a higher or equal value to the 
immediate punishment, similar to studies of the discounting 
of reinforcements. Thus, it is worth investigating the 
discounting of large delayed punishments as well as small 
ones, i.e. smaller or equal delayed values compared to the 
immediate value. Thus, the first aim of this study was to 
investigate the discounting rate of pain. It was hypothesized 
that there is a preference for immediate pain rather than for 
delayed pain, both when delayed pain is greater and smaller 
than immediate pain (H 1). Moreover, it was hypothesized 
that the discounting rate of pain is higher than it is expected 
when participants choose only delayed values (H 2). 
Little is known about the effect of reinforcement on 
the discounting rate of pain. Ostaszewski and Białaszek 
(2010) studied the discounting rate of losses combined 
with uncertain gain, but they did not compare this rate with 
the discounting rate of losses alone. Schrooten, Wiech and 
Vlaeyen (2014) studied discounting of changing values 
of pain and money combined, but like Ostaszewski and 
Białaszek (2010) they didn’t investigate discounting rates 
of pain and money separately, so it is not clear whether 
and how reinforcement (money) changed discounting rate 
of punishment (pain). There are theories concerning the 
discounting of sequences of reinforcements, but they do 
not consider punishments (Brunner & Gibbon, 1995). Thus, 
the second aim of the study was to investigate the role of 
reinforcement on pain discounting. As people generally 
tend to prefer both sooner pain and sooner reinforcement 
over delayed pain and reinforcement, it was hypothesized 
that monetary rewards for pain would increase the 
discounting rate of pain, i.e. participants would prefer pain 
combined with money even sooner than pain alone (H 3).
Our choices, like our other behaviours, are shaped 
by past consequences (Skinner, 1974). Moreover, when it 
comes to painful procedures (both medical and experimen-
tal), past experiences of pain – or in fact memories of those 
experiences – influence choices related to those procedures, 
e.g. choosing to undergo the same procedure in the future 
or not (Kahneman, 2003; Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996; 
Redelmeier, Katz, & Kahneman, 2003). Thus, question 
emerges of whether previous pain experience is related 
to the rate of discounting pain? It seems that previous 
experience of intense pain will probably be positively 
associated with avoiding immediate pain, but because of 
other variables, like delay, probability or effort, and the 
context of pain, it is difficult to predict if this will always be 
the case. Thus, the third aim of the study was to investigate 
the relation between previous pain experiences and the 
discounting rate of pain. It was hypothesized that the 
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discounting rate of dental pain would be related to previous 
experience of dental pain (H 4).
Methods
Participants
A total of 148 volunteers completed the study. 
Of those who completed the study, 105 were females 
(71%). The mean age of the participants was 22.79 
years (SD = 2.84). Participants were recruited by an 
announcement on Facebook and by snowball sampling. 
They were randomly assigned to one of two groups: less-
pain-later and more-pain-later. The less-pain-later group 
consisted of 66 participants, who had a mean age of 22.74 
years (SD = 3.26) and included 47 females (71%); the 
more-pain-later group consisted of 82 participants, who 
had a mean age of 22.83 years (SD = 2.46) and included 
58 females (71%). All participants gave their informed 
consent. The study was carried out in accordance with 
The Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association 
(Declaration of Helsinki).
Materials and procedure
Two questionnaires were used in the study, both of 
which began by asking participants their sex and age. Next, 
the participants were asked to recall the most intense dental 
pain they had ever experienced and to rate that pain on an 
11-point numeric rating scale (NRS), ranging from 0 = no 
pain, to 10 = the most intense pain they ever experienced. 
Then, participants were given a series of choices about 
experiencing pain, which asked them to decide whether 
they would prefer to experience pain of a specific intensity 
(from 0 = no pain, to 10 = most intense pain imaginable) 
now or later (the delays were a day, a week, a month, six 
months, and a year later). For both groups, immediate pain 
was increased incrementally by 1, from 1 out of 10 up 
to 10 out of 10 on the NRS. Thus, there were 10 choices 
for each of the five delays, so that participants made 
a total of 50 choices in the first part of the questionnaire 
(without reward) and 50 choices in the second part of the 
questionnaire (with reward). Order of those conditions was 
intentionally not counterbalanced, as the study was aimed 
to investigate how positive reinforcement, i.e. adding 
a desirable stimulus, influences pain discounting. Thus, 
the condition with reward needed to follow the condition 
without reward. If the condition with reward were followed 
by the condition without reward, then negative punishment 
would be studied, i.e. removing a desirable stimulus.
For the less-pain group, the delayed pain was always 
set at 3 out of 10, and for the more-pain group the delayed 
pain was always set at 8 out of 10 on the NRS. The 
following instructions were given:
Please imagine that you must undergo a painful dental 
procedure, which lasts for 50 minutes. You can choose the 
date of the procedure, but depending on that date, the pain 
intensity will be different. The procedure is not urgent, so 
choosing a specific date brings no other consequences 
than a different intensity of pain. There are no other 
contraindications or difficulties related to reaching the 
dentist. You have no plans or responsibilities that could 
prevent you from going to the dentist.
Example:
Pain intensity 1/10 now Pain intensity 8/10 in six months
Where 0 = no pain, 10 = most intense pain imaginable.
Choosing, for example, ‘Pain intensity of 1/10 now’ means 
that you prefer the immediate procedure which will cause 
pain of an intensity equal to 1/10.
After the participants completed the first part of the study, 
the following instruction was given:
Please imagine the same situation as before, but this time 
immediately after the procedure you will be paid 200 PLN 
(about $50) in cash.
Although the delayed values of reinforcement or 
punishment in many previous studies were always equal to 
the highest value of the possible ‘now’ choice, we decided 
to choose 3 out of 10 and 8 out of 10 as the delayed values 
(instead of 10 out of 10). We did so because our pilot study 
found that when delayed pain was set at 1 out of 10 or 10 
out of 10, participants changed their choices very rarely. 
Therefore, there was no possibility to observe a difference 
in the mean discounting rate between conditions without 
and with reward. 
Each participant completed one of the two versions 
(less pain later or more pain later) of the two-part 
questionnaire using an online survey created in Limesurvey. 
Results
The discounting rate was calculated using the method 
proposed by Myerson, Green, and Warusawitharana 
(Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001). The area 
under the curve (AUC) (i.e. an area under the empirical 
discounting function) was calculated. The first step was to 
determine the points of indifference, which are the means 
of the first value before changing one’s decision and the 
first value after changing one’s decision in a discounting 
task. The next step was to normalize those points and 
to normalize the values of delay, so that the points of 
indifference took values from 0 to 1 and the delay was 
expressed as a proportion of the maximum delay. Those 
normalized values were used as coordinates (x and y) to 
construct a graph of the discounting data. Vertical lines 
were drawn from each point, dividing the graph into 
a few trapezoids. The sum of the area of those trapezoids 
was the discounting rate. A small area means fast 
discounting, i.e. a preference for immediate reinforcement 
or punishment and vice versa (the larger the area, the slower 
the discounting, and the larger the preference for delayed 
reinforcement or for immediate punishment). 
Excel 2013 was used to calculate the AUC and 
STATISTICA 12 was used for the rest of the statistical 
analyses. 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was performed on AUC with group as a between-subject 
factor (‘less pain later’ and ‘more pain later’) and condition 
(‘with reward’ and ‘without reward’) as a within-subject 
factor. The ANOVA revealed a statistically significant main 
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effect of group (F(1, 146) = 1153.90, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.89) 
and a statistically significant main effect of condition 
(F(1, 146) = 28.21, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.16). No significant 
interaction between group and condition was found 
(F(1, 146) = 0.01, p = 0.91, η2 = 0.01). Planned comparisons 
revealed a statistically significant difference in AUC 
between the ‘without reward’ and ‘with reward’ conditions 
within both the less-pain-later group (F(1, 146) = 12.23, 
p < 0.001) and the more-pain-later group (F(1, 146) = 16.45, 
p < 0.001) (see Fig. 1). The mean discounting rate for the 
less-pain-later group in the ‘without reward’ condition 
was 0.36 (SD = 0.09) and 0.40 (SD = 0.10) in the ‘with 
reward’ condition. In the more-pain-later group, the mean 
discounting rate in the ‘without reward’ condition was 
0.79 (SD = 0.09) and it was 0.82 (SD = 0.06) in the ‘with 
reward’ condition. These results indicate that participants 
preferred immediate pain more when it was accompanied 
by monetary reward than when pain was not accompanied 
by monetary reward.
Figure 1. Discounting rate (AUC) for the less-pain-later 
group and the more-pain-later group in the ‘without 
reward’ and the ‘with reward’ conditions
To examine whether the participants changed their 
choices in a different moment from a hypothetical situation 
in which the choice is changed when both options (delayed 
and immediate) are of the same value, Student’s t-tests were 
performed to compare obtained AUCs with expected AUCs. 
This was necessary to conclude whether the preference for 
delayed or immediate pain was observed. Expected AUCs 
were calculated as if participants chose only the least value 
of pain for every choice which produced AUC = 0.30 for 
less-pain-later group, and AUC = 0.80 for more-pain-later 
group. Thus, values over the expected AUCs indicate 
a preference for immediate pain and values below expected 
AUCs indicate a preference for delayed pain. For less-
pain-later group there was a significant difference between 
obtained AUCs and expected AUCs for both ‘with reward’ 
condition (t = 8.04, p < 0.001, d = 1.41) and ‘without reward’ 
condition (t = 5.61, p < 0.001, d = 0.87), i.e. obtained AUCs 
were bigger than the expected AUCs. For more-pain-later 
group obtained AUC was bigger than expected AUC only 
in ‘with reward’ condition (t = 3.45, p < 0.001, d = 0.54). 
These results suggest that there is a general preference 
for immediate pain when delayed pain is weaker than 
immediate pain. When delayed pain is stronger than 
immediate pain, there is no clear preference. However, 
when pain is accompanied by monetary reward, immediate 
pain is preferred to delayed pain.
Linear regression found that the 0–10 rating of 
experienced dental pain did not predict the AUC in the 
less-pain group in the ‘without reward’ condition (β = -0.08, 
t = 64, p = 0.50; Adj. R2 = -0.01, F(1, 64) = 0.44, p = 0.50) or 
the ‘with reward’ condition (β = -0,23, t = 64, p = 0.06; Adj. 
R2 = 0.04, F(1, 64) = 3.66, p = 0.06). Moreover, the linear 
regression showed that the experienced dental-pain rating 
did not predict the AUC in the more-pain-later group in 
the ‘without reward’ condition (β = 0.02, t = 81, p = 0.86; 
Adj. R2 = -0.01, F(1, 64) = 0.03, p = 0.86) or the ‘with reward’ 
condition (β = -0.05, t = 81, p = 0.63; Adj. R2 = -0.01, 
F(1, 64) = 0.23, p = 0.63). Mean experienced dental pain in 
the less-pain-later group was 5.38 (SD = 1.87), and in the 
more-pain-later group it was 5.88 (SD = 2.37). 
Discussion
The results of our study indicate that people prefer 
immediate pain when the delayed pain is weaker, but this is 
not always the case when delayed pain is greater. Thus, we 
partially confirmed our hypothesis (H 1) stating that there 
is a preference for immediate pain rather than for delayed 
pain, both when delayed pain is greater and smaller than 
immediate pain. However, we confirmed our hypothesis 
(H 2) stating that the discounting rate of pain is higher than 
it is expected when participants choose only delayed values. 
These results are partially consistent with previous findings, 
which suggested that people tend to choose immediate pain 
over delayed pain (Hare, 1966; Story et al., 2013). It has 
been suggested that the dread caused by the anticipation 
of pain may be a crucial factor in the discounting of pain 
(Story et al., 2013). We speculate that dread might have 
influenced the preference for immediate pain. However, 
future research is needed to investigate the effect of dread 
on the discounting rate of high and low levels of pain.
Our study showed that delayed pain is discounted 
in a different way than that of the monetary losses that 
were discounted in previous research (Estle et al., 2006; 
Ostaszewski & Karzel, 2002; Weatherly & Derenne, 
2013). If delayed punishments are higher or equal to 
immediate ones, as was the case in most of the previous 
studies on punishment discounting (Estle et al., 2006; 
Ostaszewski & Karzel, 2002; Weatherly & Derenne, 2013), 
delayed punishments are always the best choice from the 
perspective of the participant. An interesting question 
emerges: why are there different preferences for delayed 
losses and delayed pain if both of them are considered 
punishment, even though there is no such variability for 
different reinforcements? We can speculate that the key 
factor here could be the dread of future pain, as Story and 
colleagues suggested (Story et al., 2013). There might 
be no such dread of future loss in the case of monetary 
discounting or this dread could be less intense. Future 
research is needed to answer this question.
Novelty of our study is the fact that it seems to be 
the first to demonstrate that pain followed by money 
is discounted slower than pain alone. We confirmed our 
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hypothesis (H 3) stating that monetary rewards for pain 
would increase the discounting rate of pain, i.e. participants 
would prefer pain combined with money even sooner than 
pain alone. We speculate that monetary reward increased 
the preference for immediate pain because the reward was 
discounted when it accompanied delayed pain in contrast 
to the reward accompanying immediate pain. Thus, the 
reward was subjectively smaller when it accompanied 
delayed pain. As previous studies on discounting rates of 
punishment combined with reinforcement did not compare 
those rates with the discounting rates of punishment alone 
(Ostaszewski & Białaszek, 2010; Schrooten et al., 2014), 
our study is the first to show the effect of reinforcement on 
the discounting rate of punishment. 
The results of this study may have important 
implications for medical practice. As reinforcement seems 
to impel people to choose sooner pain, patients could be 
encouraged to undergo a painful procedure (not only dental) 
sooner when they see clear benefits, which could possibly 
include non-monetary benefits that family or society, in 
general, can offer, especially social approval. Although an 
amount of 200 PLN (~$50) was used as a reward in our 
study, future research is needed to investigate the effects 
of different amounts of money (both smaller and bigger) 
as well as different kinds of rewards (e.g. social approval 
from different people, i.e. family members, medical 
staff, strangers etc.) on the discounting rate of pain. We 
hypothesize that bigger amounts of money would increase 
the discounting rate of pain and that social approval would 
be more effective in increasing the discounting rate, 
especially when provided by medical staff members. 
The results of our study did not support the idea that 
previous pain experience is related to the rate of pain 
discounting. Regardless of how people recalled their most 
intense pain, their experience was not related to their 
choices. Thus, although previous studies have found that 
past experiences of pain, i.e. memories of pain, influence 
choices related to painful medical and experimental 
procedures (Kahneman, 2003; Redelmeier & Kahneman, 
1996; Redelmeier et al., 2003), we did not confirm our 
hypothesis (H 4) stating that the discounting rate of dental 
pain would be related to previous experience of dental pain. 
There probably is a variable or a set of variables, such as 
the number of dental procedures undergone, in general, or 
dread of dental procedures, which originated from previous 
experiences, that influenced the choices that we studied, 
and the relationship between discounting and previous pain 
experience probably is not based simply on the most intense 
pain recalled. Determining those variables could be a good 
direction for future studies. 
Some limitations of our study should be acknowl-
edged. First, we used only one value of reward in the 
form of money, so we do not know whether and how other 
monetary values or other possible reinforcements affect 
the discounting of pain. Second, we did not control for 
dread, which could be an important factor in discounting 
pain, as Story and colleagues suggested (Story et al., 2013). 
Third, the construction of the questionnaires extorted an 
unbalanced ratio of choices between weaker and stronger 
pain, i.e. in the less-pain group, there were more choices in 
which immediate pain was stronger than delayed pain, and 
in the more-pain group, there were more choices in which 
delayed pain was weaker than immediate pain. Thus, other 
values of pain than 3 of 10 and 8 of 10 would potentially 
lead to different results. Fourth, our participants were 
mainly young adults, so we cannot generalize our results 
to older people. Moreover, 148 out of 322 participants who 
entered the study completed the whole procedure, which 
might have happened due to low motivation to complete 
an online survey or due to time-absorbing and wearying 
procedure. However, there is not clear evidence that 
both age and motivation to complete the online studies 
are moderators of discounting rate. Finally, monetary 
reward following painful dental procedure might not be 
ecologically valid. However, we aimed to use monetary 
reward as it is one of the most often studied reinforcements 
when it comes to delayed discounting (Foxall, Doyle, Yani-
de-Soriano, & Wells, 2011; Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 
1997; Jarmolowicz et al., 2014; Ostaszewski & Bialaszek, 
2010; Rachlin et al., 1991; Weatherly, 2011). As a result, 
our findings may be related to the results of previous 
studies on the discounting of monetary rewards. 
Discounting pain is an understudied issue that should 
be explored further. The process of changing the subjective 
value of pain is important for both theory and practice. 
Because punishments, particularly pain, are as important 
and common as reinforcements, we need to discover 
what variables influence decision making with regard 
to punishment. That knowledge should give us a useful 
tool for managing situations in which pain is inevitable, 
like dental procedures, or strong, as in unpleasant 
work. Knowledge of the effect of reinforcement on the 
discounting rate of pain could be used to develop strategies 
and methods aimed to encourage people to undergo painful 
procedures or situations, which they need to undergo, but 
which they may be afraid of because of the pain they would 
experience. For example, if future research finds which 
kind of reinforcements are the most effective in increasing 
the discounting rate of pain, those reinforcements may be 
used in clinical practice.
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